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LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY FAMILY LAW ON A SEPARATED PARENT’S
ABILITY TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT LIFE DECISIONS:
A COMPARISON OF RELOCATION AND INCOME IMPUTATION
J. THOMAS OLDHAM*
I.  INTRODUCTION
Separated parents have no shortage of things to fight about.  At the top of
the list is the issue of whether any restrictions should be placed on the “custo-
dial” parent’s freedom to choose a place of residence.
The American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution
contains suggested provisions regarding relocation by the custodial parent.1  I
will discuss the “gender effects” of these rules, and try to determine whether
they are consistent with other rules applicable to parents living apart.  In keep-
ing with this gender consciousness, and because most2 primary custodians are
women, I will sometimes use the feminine pronoun for the primary custodian
and the masculine for the other parent.
II.  DISCUSSION
A. Background
When parents live apart and one parent is the primary caretaker, a fairly
basic and commonly confronted question is whether the primary custodian may
live wherever she chooses.  To the extent the primary custodian is given free-
dom to relocate, that parent is allowed flexibility to best restructure her life.
One can imagine numerous bona fide reasons a primary custodian may
want to relocate.  Common rationales include the desire to be closer to parents
or other family members, go to school, obtain a better job, accommodate the ca-
reer of a new partner, or because of a preference for living in another part of the
country.  Giving the primary custodian substantial freedom of movement en-
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1. ALI PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(Preliminary Draft No. 7, 1997) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES 1997].
2. A number of studies have found that the mother is the primary custodian in approximately
90% of all cases.  See generally IRA MARK ELLMAN, PAUL M. KURTZ & ELIZABETH SCOTT, FAMILY LAW
629 (3d ed. 1998) (citing studies).
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ables the primary custodian to best structure her post-separation life3 as she
chooses.
Such freedom places significant obstacles in the path of the other parent if
that parent desires to have a meaningful role in the child’s life.4  At a minimum,
if a child is moved a significant distance away, this makes contact more expen-
sive for the parent left behind.
A related point, sometimes discussed, is how great a distance the custodial
parent must move to give rise to these concerns.  For example, a South Dakota
court has concluded that a move of 70 miles was minor and not a substantial
change in circumstances.5  The Louisiana statute pertaining to relocation pro-
vides that it applies to a move out of state or a move of over 150 miles within the
state.6
If the non-primary custodian has not maintained significant contact with
the child before a proposed relocation, it seems more clear the custodial parent
should be able to relocate.  The other parent has not played much of a role in the
child’s life, so the preferences of the primary caretaker should presumably be
entitled to more weight.  However, if both parents have been involved in the
child’s life, it is less clear whether the primary custodian should have a pre-
sumptive right to move.
No easy answer exists in this situation.  The primary custodian could be
given substantial freedom to relocate, which would make it much more difficult
for the other parent to remain involved in the child’s life. Or the non-primary
custodian could be given the right to block any move by the primary custodian,
potentially complicating the life of the primary custodian, at the very least.
Courts in the U.S. and elsewhere7 have struggled to find the best approach.
B. Different Approaches
1. Make Relocation Difficult
One possible approach would be to make it difficult to relocate, particularly
if the child seems to be well-adjusted (in terms of school, friends, etc.) in the cur-
rent domicile.  Such an approach could be phrased in different ways; one possi-
ble variant would be the old New York view.  Under this approach, if the move
would deprive the non-primary custodian of “regular and meaningful access” to
the child, relocation would presumably not be in the best interest of the child—
unless the primary custodian could show exceptional circumstances that
justified the move.8
3. Assuming the parties at one time lived together.
4. Some argue that, even if the custodial parent relocates, the other parent may maintain a
close relationship with the child by having fewer visits of longer duration.  See ALI PRINCIPLES 1997,
supra note 1, § 2.20 cmt. f.
5. Fossum v. Fossum, 545 N.W.2d 828, 832-33 (S.D. 1996).
6. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:355.1 (West 2000).
7. See Patricia Easteal, Juliet Behrens & Lisa Young, Relocation Decisions in Canberra and Perth: A
Blurry Snapshot, 14 AUST. J. FAM. L. 234 (2000).
8. See Carol Bruch & Janet Bowermaster, Relocation of Children and Custodial Parents: Public Pol-
icy, Past and Present, 30 FAM. L.Q. 245, 298 (1996).
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A somewhat diluted version of this approach was employed by a Califor-
nia court of appeals, in a case subsequently overturned by the California Su-
preme Court.9  The court of appeals held that once the non-primary custodian
could show that a move would significantly affect his access rights, the burden
would shift to the primary custodian to show the move was reasonably neces-
sary, either because not moving would impose an unreasonable hardship on the
custodial parent, or because moving would result in such a discernable benefit
that it would be unreasonable to ask that parent to forego the opportunity.10
Louisiana has adopted a statute that places the burden on the relocating parent
to show that the proposed move would be in the best interests of the child.11
2. Balance Numerous Factors
Another alternative would be to accept no presumptive right of either par-
ent to move or block a move.  A proposed move would be reviewed by a court
on a case-by-case basis after considering a number of factors.12  A number of
courts that have adopted such an approach have emphasized that relocation
cases are fact-specific, and no general rule is possible.13
3. Establish a Presumptive Right to Relocate
A third possible approach would be the converse of the first approach.  The
custodial parent would be given the right to move, unless the other parent could
show some exceptional circumstance that justified another result.
A number of recent cases have adopted similar approaches.  In California, a
custodial parent has the right to move, unless the other parent can show it
would be detrimental to the child.14  Under Tennessee law, a custodial parent
may move unless the other parent can show the move is motivated by a bad-
faith intent to deprive him of contact with the child.15  The rules in Florida16 and
Minnesota17 are similar.
Colorado has adopted a somewhat more diluted version of this type of ap-
proach.  The custodial parent has to establish a “sensible” reason for the move,
and then the burden shifts to the other parent to show that the negative impact
of the move would outweigh any benefit.18
9. Burgess v. Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996).
10. Id. at 477-78.
11. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:355.13 (West 2000).
12. This is the current New York view.  See Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145, 150 (N.Y. 1996).
13. See Baures v. Lewis, 27 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1287 (N.J. 2001); In re Marriage of Smith, 665
N.E.2d 1209 (Ill. 1996); Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283 (Wyo. 1993); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 812 P.2d 1268
(Nev. 1991).
14. Burgess, supra note 9, at 482.
15. Aaby v. Strange, 924 S.W.2d 623, 628 (Tenn. 1996).
16. See Russenberger v. Russenberger, 669 So.2d 1044, 1046 (Fla. 1996).
17. See Silbaugh v. Silbaugh, 543 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Minn. 1996); see also Kaiser v. Kaiser, 2001
WL 315647 (Okla. 2001).
18. See In re Marriage of Francis, 919 P.2d 776, 784 (Colo. 1996).
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4. The Views of Commentators
No consensus has yet arisen among commentators.  Some favor giving the
custodial parent substantial freedom to relocate,19 others advocate much more
significant restrictions on moving with the child,20 while a third group favors an
approach that would balance many factors when deciding whether a parent
may relocate with a child.21
C. Different Proposed Model Rules
1. The ALI View
The ALI suggests that as a general rule, the primary custodian should be
allowed to relocate with the child, even if it significantly impairs the other par-
ent’s ability to maintain regular contact with the child. The primary custodian is
permitted to relocate as long as the custodian has a “legitimate purpose,” which
is defined as a move: i) to be close to family; ii) for health reasons; iii) to pursue
employment or an educational opportunity; or iv) to be with a partner who is
pursuing a career or an educational opportunity elsewhere;22 this rule is not ap-
plicable to joint custody.23  Thus, the primary custodian is given the right to relo-
cate for almost any good-faith reason, except a mere desire to make a fresh start
elsewhere.
2. The American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers
The American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers have drafted a proposed
model relocation act.24  Their recommendation differs from the ALI view.  The
drafters could not agree on who should have the burden of proving what was in
the best interest of the child.  They set forth alternative provisions that the legis-
lature could choose to adopt.25
D. Guidance from Child Support Rules
1. Current Trends
A custodial parent’s interest in retaining control over where she lives is
certainly not the only instance in family law when a parent’s freedom might be
19. See Bruch & Bowermaster, supra note 8; Anne L. Spitzer, Moving and Storage of Postdivorce
Children: Relocation, the Constitution and the Courts, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 2-3.
20. See Frank G. Adams, Child Custody and Parental Relocations: Loving Your Children from a Dis-
tance, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 143, 144 (1994); Paula M. Raines, Joint Custody and the Right to Travel: Legal and
Psychological Implications, 24 J. FAM. L. 625 (1986); Merril Sobie, Whatever Happened to the “Best Inter-
ests” Analysis in New York Relocation Cases?: A Response, 15 PACE L. Rev. 685, 688-89 (1995);
21. See Steve Leben & Megan Moriarty, A Kansas Approach to Custodial Parent Move-Away Cases,
37 WASHBURN L.J. 497, 532-36 (1998).
22. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 1, § 2.20.
23. Id.  For a different approach to joint custody and relocation, see Brown v. Brown, 621
N.W.2d 70 (Neb. 2000).
24. See American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers Proposed Model Relocation Act: An Act Relating to
the Relocation of the Principal Residence of a Child, 15 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 1 (1998).
25. See id. at 20-21.
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restricted due to parenting responsibilities.  Child support rules may be con-
sulted for guidance relating to restrictions on parental autonomy in another
context.
In separated families, like intact families, it is not uncommon for a parent to
change careers or to want to take time off from work for various reasons.  When
parents live apart and the child support obligor decides to change careers, courts
are frequently asked to decide whether to adjust the child support order in light
of the obligor’s new circumstances.  This question is difficult only when the ob-
ligor does something that reduces his income.  If the income is thereby in-
creased, the order will also be increased, provided the increase is continuing and
substantial.
Currently, courts typically base child support orders on the parents’ in-
comes.26  Child support guidelines were drafted in such a way to attempt to en-
sure that separated parents would devote the same percentage of their income
to children as would parents in intact households.27  As a result, one might ex-
pect courts to reduce the child support if the obligor’s income is reduced.  How-
ever, many courts have not been inclined to do this, at least when such income
reductions are “voluntary.”  A few different approaches have evolved.
No court will reduce the child support amount if it can be determined that
the obligor is making the career change primarily to spite the other parent and
reduce child support payments.28  A minority of courts would grant a request to
reduce support, as long as the court concludes that the movant was acting in
good faith and not with the intent to lower the living standards of the custodial
household.29  However, the majority rule states that a court should not reduce
child support when the obligor has voluntarily lowered his income.
For example, a California case involved a petition by an obligor working as
a pharmacist who wanted to attend medical school.30  The obligor wanted to de-
crease the child support due while he was in school.  The court refused this re-
quest, even though the court found he was making this career change in good
faith.31  The trial court stated that “child support. . . constitutes a priority over-
head expense which must be taken into account whenever an obligor wishes to
pursue a different lifestyle or endeavor.”32  The appellate court affirmed, stating
26. HARRY KRAUSE ET AL., FAMILY LAW, CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS (4th ed. 1998).
27. Jane C. Venohr & Robert G. Williams, The Implementation and Periodic Review of State Child
Support Guidelines, 33 FAM. L.Q. 7, 9 (1999).
28. See, e.g., McKenna v. Steen, 422 So.2d 615, 617-18 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Mitchell v. Kelley, 628
So.2d 807, 809 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993).  See generally Lewis Becker, Spousal and Child Support and the
“Voluntary Reduction of Income” Doctrine, 29 CONN. L. REV. 647 (1997).
29. See, e.g., DuBois v. DuBois, 956 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Tex. App. 1997).  See also Kelly v. Hougham,
504 N.W.2d 440, 445-46 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (the court noted that the primary custodian’s income
had substantially increased, that the parties have always understood that the father would go back
to school after the mother finished school, and that the aggregate child support received by the chil-
dren throughout their minority may well be increased due to this education and the increased earn-
ing capacity that should result); see also Williams v. Williams, 202 Cal. Rptr. 10, 12 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984) (obligor and new spouse moved to pursue a simpler and less expensive lifestyle).
30. Ilas v. Ilas, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 345 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
31. Id. at 350.
32. Id. at 348.
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that the obligor “did not have the right to divest himself of his earning ability at
the expense of. . .his two minor children.”33
Similarly, a recent Maine case involved an obligor who quit working for the
National Guard (in part because he was afraid he would be involuntarily re-
tired) and returned to school.34  His ultimate goal was to obtain a medical degree.
He worked part-time while attending school and moved to reduce his support.
Even though the court found that he embarked on his new career goals in good
faith, the supreme court refused the motion to reduce the support.35  The court
stated that, although he was working as much as his schedule permitted while
attending school, “his decision to change his career and pursue a full-time edu-
cational program has imposed needless hardships on his children.”36 Because the
children would not share in his increased earning capacity due to his education
(they would be adults when he graduated), this career change was not in the
best interests of the children.  This was so even though the parents (while an in-
tact family) had an understanding that the father would go to school when the
mother’s education was completed.  Because the father’s “education would
benefit only himself, and deprive his children,” his support should not be re-
duced due to the career change.37
A number of other courts have held that child support should not be re-
duced when the obligor quits a job to go to school, unless the schooling will in-
crease the obligor’s earning capacity and the children will benefit from that in-
crease.  In other words, when the children are young enough, and the obligor
will graduate soon enough, it is more likely child support would be reduced
while the obligor attends school.38
Obligors also have moved to modify support when they took a new job or
started a new business and their income decreased.  In many instances, such
motions are denied.  Examples include instances where an attorney left his job to
start his own firm,39 a person quit his job with a lawn care company to start his
own lawn care business,40 an insurance agent started his own business as an in-
dependent agent,41 an obligor moved to another state with a new spouse and
could not find an equally high-paying job,42 and a person had the bad luck to
33. Id. at 350.
34. Harvey v. Robinson, 665 A.2d 215 (Me. 1995).
35. Id. at 217-19.
36. Id. at 217.
37. Id. at 218.
38. For example, the court did reduce the support in In re Marriage of Ehlert, 868 P.2d 1168
(Colo. Ct. App. 1994), where the period of training was short and the probable increase in income
was substantial.  Otherwise, a reduction is unlikely.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 597 So.2d 699 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1992); Little v. Little, 975 P.2d 108 (Ariz. 1999); In re Marriage of Mizer, 683 P.2d 382 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1984); Overbey v. Overbey, 698 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1997); In re Marriage of Clyatt, 882 P.2d 503
(Mont. 1994); Sabatka v. Sabatka, 511 N.W.2d 107 (Neb. 1994); Wolcott v. Wolcott, 735 P.2d 326 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1997); Baker v. Grathwohl, 646 N.E.2d 253 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994); Commonwealth, Dep’t of
Social Servs. ex rel. Ewing v. Ewing, 470 S.E.2d 608 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
39. Russo v. Russo, No. FA 81 26286 S, 1995 WL 94634 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar.2, 1995).
40. Woloch v. Foster, 649 N.E.2d 918 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
41. Askew v. Askew, 458 S.E.2d 217 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995).
42. Logan v. Bush, 621 N.W.2d 314 (N.D. 2000); see also In re Marriage of Van Doren, 474
N.W.2d 583 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991).
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quit his job and become a stockbroker just before the 1987 crash.43  Courts have
been concerned about the voluntariness of the decision that led to the change in
the obligor’s financial circumstances.  This rule has been applied even if the ob-
ligor’s job posed significant health risks,44 or required him to live on a ship for
most of the year, thereby making it difficult to have a normal life.45  These deci-
sions have been justified based on this rationale:
Of course, a father is not prohibited from voluntarily changing employment.
But. . .when the father. . .chose to pursue other employment, albeit a bona fide
and reasonable business undertaking, the risk of his success at his new job was
on the father, and not upon the children.46
This rationale would only apply to speculative new ventures or jobs when
it would be unclear whether the new job would result in an increase in income.
In other instances, the obligor may take a new job knowing his income would be
lower, but may want to do it for quality of life concerns.  For instance, the prior
job might have posed health risks, required work at undesirable times or might
have been too stressful.  Alternatively, the obligor may wish to change careers
due to social justice concerns such as wanting to leave the business world to
teach or to become a minister.  Courts that are unwilling to reduce child support
orders when an obligor voluntarily reduces his income would not reduce the
child support order if an obligor changed jobs knowing the income would be
lower—even if the obligor has a “good purpose.”
Courts have also refused to reduce child support when the obligor lowers
his income due to the pursuit of some religious activity, such as being a mis-
sionary47 or a church volunteer.48  Similarly, courts have imputed income to a
lawyer obligor whose income was very low because he represented poor peo-
ple,49 and to an obligor who devoted himself to helping farmers avoid losing
their farms due to financial hardship.50  Obligors who have pursued low-wage
career paths due to quality of life concerns have also had income imputed to
them, if they were trained in another career with a higher income.51
2. A Comment
For many custodial parents, it is very important to have the right to relo-
cate with their minor child.  For non-primary custodians, it is similarly impor-
tant to have the right to change careers, even if the change will reduce their in-
come for a period or permanently.  The trends in the law regarding relocation
and income imputation are inconsistent.  The prevailing view regarding reloca-
tion (and the ALI view) reflects a philosophy that the primary custodian should
43. Antonelli v. Antonelli, 409 S.E.2d 117 (Va. 1991).
44. Grimes v. Grimes, 596 A.2d 240, 243 (Pa. Super Ct. 1991).
45. Pullis v. Linzey, 753 So. 2d 480, 482 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
46. Antonelli, 409 S.E.2d at 119-20.
47. Bassette v. Bartolucci, 652 N.E.2d 623, 625-26 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995).
48. In re Marriage of McKeever, 583 P.2d 30, 30-31 (Or. Ct. App. 1978).
49. Robinson v. Tyson, 461 S.E.2d 397, 399 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995).
50. Perry v. Perry, 382 N.W.2d 628, 630 (N.D. 1986).
51. Rock v. Cabral, 616 N.E.2d 218, 222 (Ohio 1993).
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have substantial freedom. The lack of significant barriers to moving suggests a
wish not to impede the parent’s autonomy due to the fact of parenthood.
In contrast, child support rules seem to be moving in the other direction.  A
rule consistent with the prevailing relocation approach would give the obligor
significant freedom to structure his life and career as he in good faith would
choose.  This rule would allow an obligor the right to have his child support ob-
ligation reduced if he made a good-faith career change that reduced his income.
However, most courts ignore voluntary reductions in income by an obligor,
with the justification that parenthood substantially limits one’s choices.
There is significant tension between these two inconsistent views.  Both
views generally help women and harm men.  It would seem more fair to decide
whether parenthood should significantly limit the choices of separated parents
and promulgate consistent rules once this decision is made.
3. The ALI View Regarding Income Imputation
The ALI approach toward income imputation differs significantly from the
trend in the law summarized above.  Income is not to be imputed to a child sup-
port obligor for pursuing education or training “as long as the pursuit is not un-
reasonable in light of the circumstances.”52  Somewhat surprisingly, no guidance
is provided as to how a court should determine whether the pursuit is unrea-
sonable; presumably the hardship that the custodial household would experi-
ence if income is not imputed would be important.  Still, this seems more toler-
ant of an obligor’s career autonomy than current case law.
Similarly, income is not to be imputed to an obligor if he changes careers
unless the child’s standard of living would be “unreasonably reduced.”53  The
ALI Reporter’s comments gives two examples of how this would work.  In ex-
ample one, an obligor who is a partner working in a law firm making $12,000
per month is offered a job as a judge making $8,000 per month.  Income is not to
be imputed here, because the custodial household will still have a “comfortable”
standard of living, even with child support calculated based on the $8,000 in-
come.54  Another example discusses what should occur if an obligor lawyer
earning $8,000 monthly quits to work for legal services at a salary of $3,000, and
the custodial mother is not in the work force.  The comments state that support
should not be reduced here, because the change in the child’s circumstances
would be too great.55  Like the previous example (involving an obligor returning
to school), the ALI approach gives the obligor more freedom to change careers
than does current law, but by no means total freedom.
The ALI comments do not provide any guidance regarding reductions in
income for more “normal” people.  Consider what should occur if a truck driver
earning $4000 monthly wants to take a job earning less money so he can be
home more?  It is unclear what factors would be important in determining
whether a child’s circumstances would be “unreasonably reduced.”
52. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §
3.12(5)(a) (Tentative Draft No. 3 Part II, 1998).
53. Id. § 3.12(5)(b).
54. Id.
55. Id.
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III.  CONCLUSION
Relocation and income imputation are two issues of great importance to
separated parents.  One approach toward these issues would restrict parental
autonomy to do things that negatively affect the other parent. Under this view,
relocation with a minor child would be difficult to accomplish and child support
would not be reduced upon a voluntary reduction of income by the obligor.
Alternatively, parents could be given substantial autonomy.  Such a model
would permit relocation in most circumstances and support would be reduced if
the obligor (in good faith) decided upon a career change that reduced his in-
come.
Surprisingly, an increasing number of courts take neither view.  The cur-
rent trend is toward more liberal relocation rules, while at the same time, obli-
gors are not given the freedom to change careers and have the career change re-
flected in the amount of child support due.  At least from a parent’s rights
perspective, these rules are inconsistent.  Both favor the custodial parent but
take opposite approaches to parental autonomy.
The ALI approach is less inconsistent than the current trend in case law
mentioned in the preceding paragraph.  Custodial parents are given great free-
dom to relocate, while a change in careers for the obligor is to be reflected in the
child support order only if it would be reasonable to do so.  This gives the obli-
gor more freedom to change careers than do many courts today. In sum, al-
though the ALI view imposes more restrictions upon an obligor’s decision to
change careers than it does upon the custodial parent’s desire to move, the ap-
proach is more internally consistent than current law.
